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ABSTRACT
MELINDA N. WHITE: Framing Liberalism.
(Under the direction of James A. Stimson)
Self identification as “liberal” has declined quite notably in the United States since the mid
1960s. Part of the explanation of this decline is a growing association of the connotation of lib-
eralism along the lines of race, protest, counter culture, and the like. I investigate the portions of
this group association thesis which are possible to observe in the ANES feeling thermometer data
and observe clear evidence of growing group association with the term. That raised the question
of where the group association arises. I hypothesize media framing as the cause and observe it
by word counts, which I take as proxies for frames. I observe fairly strong associations between
presumed cause, media frames, and effect, change in perceptions of “liberals.”
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0.1 Introduction
In an effort to understand a central paradox of American politics—how so many Americans
can hold culturally and economically liberal opinions, yet call themselves conservatives—Ellis
and Stimson (2012) evaluated the way that the mass media frames the very words “liberal” and
“conservative.” In convincing fashion, they demonstrated that the dominant frames of ideological
language are ones that slur liberal symbols, and mostly venerate conservative ones. Moreover,
their search confirmed what previous research considering the mainstream media’s treatment of
ideological terms: that “conservative” is used far more frequently than “liberal” (Ellis and Stimson
2012; Brady and Ma 2003; Eisinger, Veenstra and Koehn 2007).
This disparity is not reflective of media bias, however. Instead, news media mostly cover
what political elites say, and conservative elites are much more likely to call themselves and their
platforms “conservative.” Instead, then, the message of these studies highlights a more general
phenomenon, one with important implications for the study of ideological identification in the
mass public: that the media transmit the dominant features of political debate chosen by political
elites. Thus, the symbols that citizens tie to the labels “liberal” and “conservative” are largely
dictated by the media and political elites.
Ellis and Stimson (2012) and others have demonstrated how the media frame ideological labels
for the public and the influence these frames have, but typically cover only short time periods. Ellis
and Stimson, for instance, evaluated three two-month time periods, all since 2000. While these
studies have helped build consensus that media framing effects are pervasive, I believe there is
more work to be done. I wish to build on these studies and others, and offer a longitudinal analysis
of the presentation of “liberal” and “conservative” in the mass media. In particular, I wish to
identify the dominant symbols—both political and non-political—that have been associated with
“liberal” and “conservative” from 1936—2012.
To demonstrate the capacity of media framing effects, I observe changing correlations of feel-
ing thermometers with liberals and these groups. I posit that shifts in affects are strongly influenced
by the media’s treatment of these important political and non-political groups.
0.2 The Power of Framing
The average citizen relies on the mass media for his or her political information, so it is the
media′s job to decide which stories constitute news, which issues are important, and how the issues
should be presented to the public. This statement has not always been believed as true. Early media
scholars failed to find evidence that the media played any role in persuasion and, instead, only
worked to reinforce the already held political preferences of citizens (Lazarsfeld 1948; Berelson,
Lazarsfeld and McPhee 1954; Klapper 1960).These early minimal effects views have been shown
to be wrong by more sophisticated theories describing exactly how the media influences the public.
Concepts of agenda setting, priming, and framing have been created in order to conceptualize the
power that the media have in influencing individual preferences (MacKuen 1984; Iyengar and
Kinder 1987; Krosnick 1990). Agenda setting is defined as the media’s power to decide which
issues to cover—and therefore prioritize for public action. Priming is the media’s power to focus
the attention of the public. And framing is the media’s power to choose how to present an issue—
in one perspective rather than another—including what words or tones to use in issue coverage.
The concepts of agenda setting and priming have been the main focus of many articles addressing
voting behavior, but in the context of policy preferences and considerations, framing may be the
better choice.
In an effort to show how elites can use the media in order to manipulate public opinion, Chong
and Druckman (2007) consider real world scenarios in which elites are using competing frames in
order to gain support for their stances on various policies. They pit frames with varying degrees
of strength against one another and find that the strength of a frame influences the power of the
frame. Specifically, they find that as a frame’s strength increases the persuasion power associated
with the frame also increases. Zaller (1992) give an example of another way in which competing
frames are able to influence public opinion. Zaller (1992) presents the ”Receive-Accept-Sample”
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model (RAS) arguing that individuals have conflicting views on specific issues and the individual’s
preferences at any given time are determined by what considerations are at the top of his or her
head. He uses liberal and conservative considerations as an example of the RAS model and shows
that the probability of a liberal response at any given time is a factor of the number of liberal
considerations available in a person’s mind divided by the individual’s total number of both liberal
and conservative considerations. Therefore, the media have the ability to influence an individual’s
views by repeatedly framing specific issues in a certain context in order to increase the proportion
of issues considered in that context.
0.2.1 What Considerations?
When Americans decide that they do or do not like “liberals” as a group, who is it that they
have in mind? A natural way to approach the question would be to decide what “liberal” implies in
terms of policy preferences and then assume that the sorts of people who hold those preferences are
what people have in mind, but that will not work because many people who advocate the standard
liberal agenda tell us that they do not particularly like “liberals.” Many Americans who want
government to do more, to sustain Social Security and Medicare, to increase the minimum wage,
to support labor unions, to enhance workplace safety, to clean up the environment, to do more on
education then tell us that they do not think of themselves as liberals and do not particularly like
liberals as a group.
So—in Zaller’s 1992 terms—the considerations that come to mind when Americans think about
liberals are not Medicare or Social Security or education or environment or minimum wage or all
the other things that actual liberals stand for. So what are the considerations that spring to mind
and how could we know them? Those are among the central questions of this research.
And there is more than mere slippage between “liberal” as a set of policy preferences and
“liberal” as a symbol applied to some mysterious “them” described by the label. The policy pref-
erences are on average very popular. And the “them” are on average very unpopular, a group most
Americans prefer not to join. So the slippage is directional. “Liberal” as policy preferences on
specific issues is popular. “Liberal” as a symbol and as a description of a group of actors is not.
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Party has a complicated, not simple, relationship to “liberal” as a policy preference and “lib-
eral” as a symbol. Democrats have long known that the latter is unpopular and so they have
divorced themselves from it. While “liberal” is deeply unpopular, the Party of liberalism is thriv-
ing. Its symbols are more positive than negative and it wins elections.1 Because Democrats do not
attach themselves to the symbol “liberal,” it remains possible that the party and its candidates do
well while its symbol pleases only a small minority of voters.
Having largely ruled out the obvious, that the considerations of “liberalism” in the minds of
citizens are the substance of liberalism, I now have a vacuum to be filled. If not policy and not
the sorts of people who advocate that policy, what are the considerations that Americans bring to
the term. That question motivates my search for such considerations in the public dialogue about
politics. I will ask, when Americans encounter the term “liberal” what other symbols are they
likely to encounter with it? In particular, because I believe that the symbol changes connotations
over time and from the prominent events of politics, I shall search for those other symbols in
media coverage of politics. I think about the flow of symbols and images over time, and I try to
reconstruct that flow by observing what citizens might have seen linked to liberalism if they were
reading the daily newspaper over a long span of time.
0.3 Research Design
I begin with the knowledge that the connotation of “liberal” has grown over the years and that
it acquired associations with various groups (e.g., blacks, poor people, people on welfare, labor
unions) as it grew. So what “liberal” means to the typical survey respondent of the last two or three
decades is quite dramatically changed from our image of liberals and liberalism from the periods
of the New Deal, Fair Deal, and New Frontier.2 I believe that the changes were produced by the
crucial political events beginning with the civil rights movement of the 1960s and in particular in
the way such events were packaged for public consumption in the news.
My problem is to observe the framing of liberalism over a seventy year span of media coverage
1Indeed it is the party of conservatism that is engaged in soul searching about its unpopular ideological image as I
write.
2I develop the evidence of these changed associations in Section 2 below.
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in order to explain why public perceptions of the term have become infused with strong group
associations. It is helpful to admit at the outset that I am not up to the task.
Observing framing in text is a subtle and nuanced business, far more demanding that I could
hope to achieve with human reading and human coding. Seventy years and some 30,000 stories
are the text in question. That is more than I could do at all. And then there would be questions of
quality.
It remains a matter of dispute whether automated coding of framing is within reach. For me
that is an interesting debate. What I know for sure is that it is not within my reach. Thus though
“frame” is the concept in question, I will proceed with the much easier task of counting words
instead. I shall count the usage of words like “black” or “poor people” or “labor union” in stories
that include reference to liberalism and make the very strong assumption that the counts will be
a crude proxy for frames. If “black” appears in a story that mentions liberals, for example, I am
assuming that there is some probability that the story might frame the growing support for blacks
by liberals (or the growing support of liberals by blacks) or some similar idea.3 I count on the power
of aggregation of very large numbers of error-prone classifications to get the main dimensions of
the issue right even while some individual errors are inevitable.
Ultimately my question is causal. I know from the group associations of the survey response
to “liberals” that the group associations of “liberal” changed. My question is can I explain that
change from the flow of inferred frames in media coverage of politics. The question for each
group is multivariate. Can I explain the growing correlation, for example between “liberals” and
“blacks” with media frames connecting liberal and black? That is my goal.
0.3.1 Measuring Media Frames
In order to test my theory, I operationalize the cause into the proportion of articles per year
connecting group identities and the term “liberal.” I use both ProQuest, which has articles available
from the The New York Times from 1936 to 1979, and LexisNexis, which has articles available from
The New York Times from 1980 to 2012, in order to obtain articles mentioning the term “liberal.”
3And my assumption will be wrong, as a critic points out, if the story is about the former liberal Supreme Court
Justice Hugo Black.
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In order to get a sample of articles that are most likely to be both seen and read by the population,
I limit the search to only contain articles from the front page of The New York Times. At the end,
I am left with 16,103 articles from The New York Times that mention “liberal” from 1936 to 2012.
4”
I use a Python script in order to measure the connections between the term “liberal” and group
identities. The script is designed to upload all of the articles downloaded from both ProQuest and
LexisNexis and to search each one for mentions of certain groups contained in a political symbols
dictionary that contains 37 unique groups and was modeled after questions from the American
National Elections Studies’ cumulative file. These groups range from “blacks” and “poor” to
“church goers” and the “military.” As the program parses through each article, it creates a list
of all of the groups mentioned, and it simultaneously keeps track of the proportion of articles
mentioning each group per available year. The resulting group proportions from each run are used
as the explanatory variables in this study.
Mr. Kennedy, the new chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Commit-
tee, called the hearings on the state of American health care as the Democrats began
seizing the initiative on issues such as health care, labor and education. Push for Lib-
eral Agenda The hearings are central to Mr. Kennedy’s renewed liberal manifesto,
a call for fresh programs to help the poor and banish the conservative mood that he
criticizes as “survival of the fittest.” There is a tendency to label those without enough
insurance to cover hospital costs as “loafers who are going along for the ride,“Mr.
Kennedy said.
The above text shows an excerpt from an article used in the study5. The article, titled “U.S.
Health Care Faulted in Senate,” addressed the nation’s concern over adequate healthcare for U.S.
citizens and is used as a “liberal” article in my sample. The italicized words are group mentions that
4I am not concerned with the overlap of articles that mention both conservative and liberal. When these articles are
controlled for, I received the same results, so I chose to leave them in the sample. A table of these results can be found
in Appendix A
5The full article can be found in Appendix A
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appear in the text. As you can see the word “labor” appears multiple times in this excerpt alone,
so this article was counted by the script file as mentioning labor groups. The groups poor and
conservative were also counted. It is important to note that even though “labor” appears multiple
times in this article, the article is still counted only once in the overall proportion for this group.
This is because the proportion is calculated from the number of articles in a year mentioning a
certain group and not from the total number of group mentions in a year.
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Figure 1: Group Mentions
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of the average results from the content analysis. All
37 categories from the Political Symbols Dictionary can be seen sized and shaded according to
their relative frequency within the articles. On the left, you can see the group mentions associated
with the term “liberal.” While many of the frequencies are to be expected based on the modern day
associations with the term “liberal,” it is interesting to note the unexpected group associations. The
figure shows that symbols, such as “Republican,” often appear alongside the term “liberal,” and
even though this particular symbol is not typically associated with the term, it still appears more
often than the other 36 categories.
The second figure shows the group mentions associated with the term ”conservative.” Unlike
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“liberal,” “conservative” can be seen to be associated often with many groups with the military
being associated most often with the term. It is interesting to note that while the group conserva-
tives are the most common group associated with liberals, liberals appear to be low on the list of
group being associated with conservatives. This can be expected given the negative associations
that come with the term “liberal,” which would cause conservatives to want to distance themselves
from the word.
I believe that the substantial differences in these two figures provide support for the idea that
the terms “liberal” and “conservative” are being framed differently even when associated with
various groups, however I believe that, while framed differently, they are still mentioned together
in articles. It is natural for “liberal” to be used as the opposite of “conservative” and vice versa.
So while both terms show relationships with group mentions, I believe that when the terms from
the political symbols dictionary are used in conjunction with the term “conservative” it is simply
a method in which individuals are showing the opposite of “liberal,” and not that the groups are
being directly associated with the term.
0.4 Changing Associations of the Symbol “Liberal”
I begin by observing that the meaning of “liberal” may have changed in the seven decades
after it first came into common usage as a description of Roosevelt’s New Deal. Although it is
pretty clear what policies and policy proposals were packaged with the ideological label, when I
think instead of what people and groups it implicated, I have little but surmise before 1964 when
the American National Election Studies began exploring more symbolic associations by means of
feeling thermometers.6
The feeling thermometers—by inference from correlations—allow me to explore “who” people
have in mind when they respond to liberals as a group. And when the thermometers become
available over the 1960s and 1970s they begin to establish a portrait of the associates of liberalism
in terms of racial identities (blacks, black Militants, civil rights leaders), beneficiaries (poor people
6Presumably “liberal” then meant “New Dealer” and was applied to all sorts of people who supported labor rights
and benefits and those who thought activist government was the solution to economic depression. But I must presume
where I have no data.
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and people on welfare) and then the traditional link to labor unions.
I present the data of correlations between the “liberals” feeling thermometer and those of these
other groups in Figure 2. Looking first at the patterns of all of the series, we see a sharp growth
of the average correlation between “liberals“ and the others in the early years (.19 in 1964 to .34
in 1978) followed by an apparent steady state thereafter (with exactly the same .34 correlation in
2008 as thirty years earlier).
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Figure 2: The Correlations of the “Liberals” Feeling Thermometer and Six Other Groups
Of the particular group associations with liberalism the most striking is race. The liberal symbol
in the public mind became connected with “blacks” when first measured in 1964 and rose steadily
thereafter, as is also true for the more time bound “civil rights leaders” and “black militants.”
(Civil rights leaders produced the highest such correlation ever recorded, .52 in 1980). From my
knowledge of the history that tied civil rights protests of the early 1960s to liberalism, it seems
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clear that if I had been able to observe a correlation between black and liberal as late as say 1960,
it would have been effectively zero. So the growth that I can actually observe is probably only part
of the larger picture.
No longer the ideology of the white working man, it seems clear that the infusion of racial
images into the response to liberals and liberalism is a large part of the declining popularity of
the label. If race had just been the civil rights movement in the South, it is hard to know how the
long term might have played out. For the nonviolent civil rights movement played to strongly held
American core beliefs about legal (at least) equality. But in the late 1960s black militants (like
the Black Panther Party) and urban riots dominated the news about race, and the white response to
both was very largely negative.
The Problem How then do I explain the growing association of various groups with the symbol
“liberal?” My starting point is to ask what Americans were exposed to in the media dialogue about
politics. I turn to that analysis now.
0.5 Explaining the Change
The word counts (transformed into proportions) leave me with 37 times series, each of 77 years,
representing how often each of the symbols in the symbols dictionary appears each year in stories
that mention “liberal.” I have observed the response of the electorate in the feeling thermometer
correlations seen previously. The word count, which I take to be a proxy for a frame count, is my
candidate stimulus to explain the response.
The question then becomes is it? Can I understand the growth of symbolic associations to be
a response to a growth of stories framing those same connections.7 I observe the beginnings of an
answer in Table 1 which reports the correlation between the dependent variable, the thermometer
correlations, and the independent variables, the counts. I present them for six series for which I
have data on the dependent variable from voter surveys.
7I am agnostic about the question of whether the effects we observe are somehow due to the media themselves or
would arise from just the factual reporting of events which are themselves the causal factor. All that matters for me is
that the stimulus is observed. Whom it is due to does not matter.
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Table 1: Correlations of Liberal and Group Feeling Thermometers and Group Mentions
Feeling Thermometer Correlations with “Liberals”
Civil
Rights Poor
Group Mentions Blacks Unions Leaders Welfare People Militants
Blacks 0.459 – – – – –
Unions – 0.001 – – – –
Civil Rights Leaders – – 0.235 – – –
Welfare – – – 0.342 – –
Poor People – – – – -0.329 –
Militants – – – – – -0.551
N 20 18 5 8 14 6
The answer is mixed. For three associations I observe positive correlations, the expected di-
rection. But with many N’s on the order of 7 or 8, the deck is stacked against finding significant
associations. One, the correlation between counts of black frames and feeling thermometer cor-
relations of black and liberal is significant at p<0.05. For the similar correlations of civil rights
leaders (0.235) and people on welfare (0.345), n’s are just too small for significance. For these I
have the sense that something is going on but not quite the confidence to say it.
Race To get further beneath the surface I look briefly at figures of each of these relationships. In
Figure 3 I display the feeling thermometer correlations (in red dash) along with the counts of black
references over time. The feeling thermometers show a gently linear trend, starting at 0.19 when
first observed in 1964 (and presumably lower still when not observed earlier) rising to average
around 0.30.
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Figure 3: Mentions of Black and Correlations of Liberal and BlackFeeling Thermometers
The pattern of the frame counts looks more like the response to an intervention in the 1960s. It
starts at essentially zero before the 1960s, rises fairly dramatically in the years that race was near
the top of the American political agenda, and levels off to a near steady state after about 1980,
never declining. Race came and went on the agenda of national politics. But it came and stayed in
the meaning of liberalism.
Clearly the rate at which race appears in stories about liberalism, roughly 30 percent of the
time, paints a pretty starkly racial picture of perceived ideology in America. I know from the
dependent variable that Americans associate race with liberalism, and I know from the analysis of
frames that there is good reason to do so.
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Figure 4: Mentions of Unions and Correlations of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers
Labor Unions There is nothing new about the association of liberal with labor. It dates to the
New Deal. Nonetheless I can see from Figure 4 that the association of liberal with labor has grown
fairly substantially, particularly in recent decades. It is immediately obvious that media framing
cannot explain this growth because it has occurred against a trend toward declining focus on unions
in frames about liberalism.8 But the frame counts I observe fit our experience, which is that union
labor is an ever-declining part of the conflict between left and right. The correlation, at .001, is
about as dramatic a way as one can imagine to deny any relationship between media frames and
perception of labor as connected to liberalism.
8If the analysis were extended beyond the Tea Party election of 2010, I would expect to see renewed focus on
conflict involving unions after the GOP decided to openly attack unions rather than largely ignoring them as it had
done since the 1950s.
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Figure 5: Correlations of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders Feeling Thermometers
Civil Rights Leaders Civil rights leaders were prominent players on the stage of American pol-
itics for perhaps a decade, 1962–1972. With the success of the civil rights agenda and the assas-
sination of Marin Luther King, the most prominent exemplar, they left the stage almost as quickly
as they came. Consequently I have a very limited span of evidence of their centrality. That cen-
trality is very very high for the brief period for which I have data, but shows no particular trend.
(See Figure 5.) Probably that is very largely due to missing data for the crucial period 1955 (the
Montgomery bus boycott) to 1968. When I have no data is when all the action occurred.
I am left with an anomaly: civil rights leaders seemed to have left a powerful imprint—indeed
the most powerful of all groups and symbols—without even figuring largely in the framing of
liberalism.
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Figure 6: Mentions of Welfare and Correlations of Liberal and Welfare Feeling Thermometers
People on Welfare The ideological wars of the 1950s through 1980s were often fought over the
hot button word “welfare.” Conservatives attacked those who did not work and drew government
checks and liberals defended them, if not very effectively. And so “welfare” became part of the
meaning of liberalism. Like labor unions, there is no apparent trend toward growth of welfare
as a component symbol of liberalism. It just hangs in there. In the time that it was clearly on
the agenda, when conservative Republicans in the House and the liberal Bill Clinton were both
trying to eliminate “welfare as we know it,” (but for very different motives) there is a suggestive
relationship between a spike in media attention in 1996 and a smaller infusion of welfare content
into the meaning of liberalism. (See Figure 6.)9
9Conservatives, in a curious shift of ideology, changed the focus of their attacks in 2012. Always before they have
focused on work and the work ethic as the defining distinction between good and evil. Beginning with Mitt Romney’s
famous 47% remark in 2012, they have turned increasingly to attacking “takers,” by which they now mean workers
who pay no taxes or retirees who have worked for a lifetime who are now “taking” health and retirement benefits. This
must cause some consternation for those who have left welfare for work only to discover than in their virtuous new
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Figure 7: Poor People and Correlations of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers
Poor People It would be tempting to treat poor people as just the same category as people on
welfare. That temptation needs to be avoided because there are vast differences between public
opinion on the despised “welfare” and the generosity shown when American are asked to evaluate
programs of assistance to people who are struggling to make ends meet. Despising “welfare” does
not imply harsh attitudes toward poor people (although Gilens (2000) suggests that poor people of
color fare distinctly less well). So treatment of the poor is a fairly standard component of the image
of liberals. In the brief period for which I have data on it, it does not appear to have substantially
changed. There is an intriguing increase in the mention of the poor along with liberal (ses Figure
9.) centered curiously around the time that both liberals and conservatives were advocating welfare
reform. But there is no apparent connection between media mentions and the survey image of
liberals.
identity they are now called “takers.”
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Figure 8: Mentions of Militants and Correlations of Liberal and Militant Feeling Thermometers
Black Militants Like civil rights leaders, black militants had largely come and gone before they
became an object of respondent appraisal in the ANES. So it is hard to know what to make of a
relative handful of people who once made a lot of noise and got lots of attention—then evaluated
many years later when no longer around. One fact is inescapable. Every symbol, every group,
that has a strong connection with race is very highly associated with images of liberalism, even a
decade or more after leaving the spotlight. (See Figure 10.) The evidence for the racialization of
the image of liberalism is now quite compelling.
Is this a media framing story? Well one can see framing rising in the late 1960s and early
1970s, followed by a rise in the feeling thermometer correlations a decade later. But it takes a bit
of imagination to see it. And if I stick by hard standards of evidence, it isn’t there.
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0.5.1 Statistical Model
In order to test my theory, I use an error correction model. This is best because the behavior
of my dependent variables, the Correlations of Liberal and Group Feeling Thermometers, can be
assumed to be related to the independent variable in the long run, and the short run changes in
the correlations can be assumed to respond to deviations from the long run equilibrium (Hamilton
1994; De Boef and Keele 2008).
∆yt = β0 + β1yt−1 + β2xt + β3∆xt + e (1)
Equation 1 shows the regression formula used with y being equal to the Correlations of Liberal and
Group Feeling Thermometers and x being the Proportion of Articles Mentioning each Group. It
calculates the change in correlations at time t as a function of lagged correlations, the Proportion of
Articles Mentioning each Group at time t, the change in the proportions at time t, and the intercept.
0.5.1.1 Framing or Something Else?
In an effort to again ask whether or not one can understand changing symbolic associations to
be a response to framing, I run further statistical models on my data. These models allow me to
tell more of the causal story by providing more detailed measures of the relationship between the
changing levels of symbolic associations and the changing levels of stories framing those connec-
tions. The relationship begins to become clearer with the help of Table 210 which reports the results
from single equation error correction models between the dependent variable, the thermometer cor-
relations, and the independent variable, the counts. The results were calculated by the statistical
model mentioned earlier with the coefficient on the Change in Group Mentions being equivalent
to β3 and the error correction coefficient being calculated as β2β1
10While some may be concerned of the causal relationship between the independent and dependent variables given
the high frequencies of the term “conservative” in “liberal” articles (shown in Figure 1), I believe that this is an
unnecessary concern. Table 3 (found in Appendix A) shows results from single equation error correction models
between the thermometer correlations and the counts of articles that mention the term “liberal” and exclude the term
“conservative.” The corresponding findings are equivalent to those presented here.
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Table 2: Explaining Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Group Feeling Thermometers
Feeling Thermometer Correlations with “Liberals”
Civil
Change in Rights Poor
Group Mentions Blacks Unions Leaders Welfare People Militants
Blacks 0.135 – – – – –
(0.399)
Unions – 0.047 – – – –
(0.794)
Civil Rights Leaders – – 0.959 – – –
(0.078)
Welfare – – – -0.081 – –
(0.849)
Poor People – – – – 0.150 –
(0.339)
Militants – – – – – -0.010
(0.941)
Error Correction -0.115 -0.269 -1.274 -0.309 -0.338 -0.589
(0.000) (0.068) (0.113) (0.065) (0.000) (0.228)
N 20 18 5 8 14 6
Adjusted R2 0.57 0.07 0.96 0.44 0.71 0.62
P Values in parentheses
The results are clear. For five of the six models, I observe either a statistically significant coef-
ficient for the short-run effect or a statistically significant coefficient for the long-term multiplier.
This is even more surprising given the small N’s and limited degrees of freedom for three out of
the six series.
Race The relationship for blacks has some of the most interesting results. The first parameter
estimate shows that a Change in Mentions of Blacks has a positive but not statistically significant,
at p ≤ 0.05, effect on the Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Black Feeling Thermometers.
This means that the model does not provide support that there is short-run flow of the Granger
type. However, the Error Correction coefficient is correctly signed and statistically significant at
p ≤ 0.05. Substantively, this means that there is evidence to believe the Correlations of Liberal
and Black Feeling Thermometers have an equilibrium with long-run Blacks Mentions which is
corrected when one or the other strays from target levels. This finding provides support for the
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hypothesis that shifts in group affects are strongly influenced by how the media treats them.
Long-Run Expected Change in Correlation
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Figure 9: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Black Feeling Thermometers
A visual representation of this relationship can be seen in Figure 9 which shows the long-run
effects of a Change in Black Mentions on the Correlations of Liberal and Black Feeling Ther-
mometers. The figure shows that, while there is no immediate effect of a Change in Mentions of
Blacks on the Correlations of Liberal and Black Feeling Thermometers, there is a long-term effect
that occurs beginning at t − 1. While the expected changes in correlation may appear to be small
given their range from -0.0275 to 0.0275, they show that both an increase and decrease in black
mentions has the ability to change the Correlation of Liberal and Black Feeling Thermometers by
0.0275 or 2.75%. Given that the correlations themselves range between 0.15 and 0.40 this can be
seen as a substantial and meaningful effect.
Labor Unions The relationship for labor unions appears to be similar to, but more subtle than,
the relationship for blacks. The first parameter estimate shows that a Change in Mentions of Unions
has a positive but not statistically significant, at p ≤ 0.10, effect on the Change in the Correlations
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of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers. This means that the model does not provide support
that there is short-run flow of the Granger type. However, the Error Correction coefficient is
correctly signed and statistically significant at p ≤ 0.10. This means that there is evidence to
believe the Correlations of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers have an equilibrium with
long-run Mentions of Labor Unions which is corrected when one or the other strays from target
levels.
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Figure 10: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers
Figure 10 shows the long-run effects of a Change in Mentions of Labor Unions on the Cor-
relations of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers. The figure shows that, while there is no
immediate effect of a Change in Mentions of Unions on the Correlations of Liberal and Union
Feeling Thermometers, there is a long-term effect that occurs beginning at t − 1. While the ex-
pected changes are quite small, ranging from about -0.006 to 0.006, they are present and provide
support for the hypothesis that shifts in group affects are strongly influenced by how the media
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treats them.
Civil Rights Leaders Out of all of the modeled relationships, the relationship for civil rights
leaders is unique because it is the only one that shows a short-run, immediate effect on the de-
pendent variable. The first parameter estimate shows that a Change in Mentions of Civil Rights
Leaders has a positive and statistically significant, at p≤ 0.10, effect on the Change in the Correla-
tions of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders Feeling Thermometers. This is a surprising and especially
meaningful result given its finding in an N of only 5, and it provides support for the hypothesis that
shifts in group affects are strongly influenced by how the media treats them. Unlike the previous
two models, the Error Correction coefficient is not statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05.
Short-Run Expected Change in Correlation
of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders Feeling Thermometers
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Figure 11: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders
A visual representation of this relationship can be seen in Figure 11 which shows the short-
run effects of a Change in Mentions of Civil Rights Leaders on the Correlations of Liberal and
Civil Rights Leaders Feeling Thermometers. The figure shows that there is an immediate effect
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of 0.959 on the Correlations of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders Thermometer for a 1 unit change
in Mentions of Civil Rights Leaders. While this may appear to be a huge effect it is actually
reasonable since a Change in Mentions of Civil Rights Leaders only ranges from -0.15 to 0.15.
This means that a 0.15 increase or decrease in Mentions of Civil Rights Leaders has the power to
immediately change the Correlations of Liberal and Civil Rights Leaders Feeling Thermometers
by about 0.14 or 14%.
People on Welfare The relationship for welfare appears to be similar to the relationship for
labor unions in that it is extremely subtle. The first parameter estimate shows that a Change in
Mentions of Welfare has a negative but not statistically significant, at p ≤ 0.10, effect on the
Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Union Feeling Thermometers. This means that the
model does not provide support that there is short-run flow of the Granger type. However, the
Error Correction coefficient is correctly signed and statistically significant at p≤ 0.10. This means
that there is evidence to believe the Correlations of Liberal and Welfare Feeling Thermometers
have an equilibrium with long-run Mentions of People on Welfare which is corrected when one or
the other strays from target levels.
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Long-Run Expected Change in Correlation
of Liberal and Welfare Feeling Thermometers
Change in Mentions of Welfare
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Figure 12: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Welfare Feeling Thermometers
Figure 12 shows that, while there is no immediate effect of a Change in Mentions of People
on Welfare on the Correlations of Liberal and Welfare Feeling Thermometers, there is a long-term
effect that occurs beginning at t − 1. While the expected changes are quite small, ranging from
about -0.002 to 0.002, they are present and provide support for the hypothesis that shifts in group
affects are strongly influenced by how the media treats them.
Poor People The relationship for poor people appears to be both strong and positive, at least in
the long-term. The first parameter estimate shows that a Change in Mentions of Poor People has
a positive but not statistically significant, at p ≤ 0.10, effect on the Change in the Correlations
of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers. However, the Error Correction coefficient is
correctly signed and statistically significant at p ≤ 0.05. This means that there is evidence to
believe the Correlations of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers have an equilibrium
with long-run Mentions of Poor People which is corrected when one or the other strays from target
levels. Figure 13 shows that there is a long-term effect of a Change in Mentions of Poor People
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on the Correlations of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers that occurs beginning at
t− 1. The expected changes range from about -0.045 to 0.045 and are associated with a long-term
positive relationship between the two variables. The figure shows that a 0.15 increase or decrease
in the Mentions of Poor People has the power to Change the Correlations of Liberal and Poor
People Feeling Thermometers by about 0.035 or 3.5%. This is a sizable and meaningful effect
given that the correlations range from 0.15 to 0.40.
Long-Run Expected Change in Correlation
of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers
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Figure 13: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Poor People Feeling Thermometers
Black Militants The model shows no relationship between Mentions of Black Militants and
the Correlations of Liberal and Militant Feeling Thermometers. This is also evident in Figure 14
which shows a virtually flat line of effects. Both of these findings, along with the insignificant
correlations, give us reason to believe that black militant symbols do not affect the Correlations of
Liberal and Militant Feeling Thermometers.
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Long-Run Expected Change in Correlation
of Liberal and Militants Feeling Thermometers
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Figure 14: Expected Change in the Correlations of Liberal and Militant Feeling Thermometers
0.6 Conclusion
Is this a media framing story? Further analysis, additional data, and more advanced tools
would be necessary in order to focus more specifically on frames rather than counts, but the pre-
liminary results show support for the hypothesis. While simply looking at the correlations between
“liberal” mentions and the feeling thermometers of certain groups produces an unclear result, the
results from the error correction models show that mere mentions of the term “liberal” with spe-
cific groups has long and/or short term effects on the feeling thermometers of those groups. This
means that individuals are connecting certain groups to their ideas of “liberal” by seeing the two
paired together in a story. It will be interesting, in the future, to see how the tones and frames of
the articles affect the relationships formed between “liberal” and these groups.
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APPENDIX
.1 Sample Article
U.S. HEALTH CARE FAULTED IN SENATE
January 13, 1987
Testifying before a Senate Committee today, Joseph A. Califano Jr. called health care in this
country ”a pothole system because it damages our people and shatters their lives.” ”It is unprece-
dented in our history that as unemployment goes down, fewer people than ever are covered by
insurance,” said Mr. Califano, who was Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare under Presi-
dent Carter. Americans have increasingly turned to jobs in service-related fields, he told the Senate
Labor and Human Resources Committee, and such jobs often come with ”no health care or inade-
quate health care.” Problems for 50 Million People ”The number of uninsured jumped 30 percent
between 1980 and 1985,” he said. ”When those with inadequate insurance are added, more than
50 million Americans each year face access problems.” The hearing, called by Senator Edward M.
Kennedy, Democrat of Massachusetts, set the stage for a debate over efforts to provide insurance
protection from catastrophic health care costs for the elderly and disabled. Mr. Kennedy, the new
chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, called the hearings on the state
of American health care as the Democrats began seizing the initiative on issues such as health care,
labor and education. Push for Liberal Agenda The hearings are central to Mr. Kennedy’s renewed
liberal manifesto, a call for fresh programs to help the poor and banish the conservative mood that
he criticizes as ”survival of the fittest.” There is a tendency to label those without enough insurance
to cover hospital costs as ”loafers who are going along for the ride,” Mr. Kennedy said. ”They are
not. They are hard-working, compassionate people who believe in the American dream and who
are living in fear” about paying for sudden illnesses. The key witness, Mr. Califano, echoed Mr.
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Kennedy’s call for compassion. ”No just society can deny the right of its citizens to the health
care they need,” he said. ”We are the only industrial society that does.” Mr. Califano said that
despite the fact that the United States had the most expensive health care system in the world -
costing $460 billion in 1986, almost 11 percent of the Gross National Product - there had been
a dramatic jump in the number of younger Americans who were uninsured. Since 1979, he said,
the number of people under 65 years of age without full-time health insurance has grown at a rate
of more than a million a year, from 29 million to 37 million. Three-quarters of these 37 million
people are employed or dependent on an employed person, he said, but typically they work for
low wages in small businesses with fewer than 25 employees. Almost half of the uninsured are
married and over 30 years old, he said, and about 60 percent are employed full time. Robert M.
Ball, a former commissioner of Social Security who is now at the Center for the Study of Social
Policy in Washington, seconded Mr. Califano’s concerns and voiced concern about what would
happen if there was another recession. Holes in ’Safety Net’ He said the ”safety net” of the Med-
icaid health program for the poor was ”full of holes.” ”It is available to less than 50 percent of
the population living below the rock-bottom level of officially defined poverty,” he said, defining
this as $10,989 for a family of four in 1985. Talking about the worsening gaps in protecting the
elderly, Mr. Ball said: ”Medicare is the dimming of bright hopes. Medicare now pays only a little
more than 40 percent of the total health care costs of the elderly. But the elderly are paying as
much today as they were before Medicare first came in.” The costs for everyone are still rising. In
1986, Mr. Califano told the Senators, the increase in the price of medical care was six times that of
the increase in the overall Consumer Price Index, which measures the price of goods and services
in the economy. Mr. Califano cited a study by Prof. Uwe Reinhart of Princeton University that
asserts that the United States had a higher rate of increase in health care expenditures in the last
five years than at any time in the history of the nation. ”The preliminary projections for 1987 are
ominous,” Mr. Califano, who now practices law in Washington and heads the health care commit-
tee of the Chrysler Corporation, said in his prepared statement. ”At Chrysler, where we spent $58
million less than planned for health care in 1984, price inflation presents a risk of our spending
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up to $31 million more than planned in 1987.” Mr. Kennedy introduced a bill today that would
provide catastrophic health insurance for the elderly and disabled. He said the bill ”embodies” the
plan that Dr. Otis R. Bowen, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, announced last Nov.
19. Debate Over Bowen Plan There has been fierce debate within the Reagan Administration over
the Bowen plan, with many conservatives saying it would expand the role of government at the
expense of the private insurance industry, but Mr. Kennedy regards it as an excellent approach.
President Reagan is expected to offer some sort of proposal on catastrophic health insurance in his
State of the Union Message on Jan. 27, but it is likely to emphasize the role of private industry
more and government less than Dr. Bowen’s plan. Asking that the ”unfair gaps” in insurance
coverage be rectified, several witnesses offered horror stories about Medicare and Medicaid, the
health programs for the elderly and the poor. ”Pregnant women have been turned away after being
unable to pay a $3,500 deposit and fearing the debt that would be incurred in a family of four and
a combined income of $5,800 per year,” said David Smith, the medical director of the Brownsville
Community Health Center in Texas. Death of an Infant Dr. Smith told the story of one woman who
turned to a midwife for a complicated delivery rather than paying the $2,500 deposit at the hospital
for ”prenatal management,” and went on to deliver a one and a half pound baby. ”The child was
transferred via cab in a plastic bag to the emergency room,” Dr. Smith said in his statement to the
committee. ”The child died three days later.” ”A $3,500 deposit is just that, a deposit,” Dr. Smith
concluded. ”I’m sorry that I did not learn the price of human life when I went to medical school.
I still have not.” Mr. Califano suggested that 400,000 to 500,000 hospital beds, representing half
of those in the country, should be eliminated in the next decade, as a way of streamlining costs.
He said that hospitals simply fold in the cost of bad debts or charity care into private costs and
pass it along to private patients. ”The total cost of uncompensated care is more than $8 billion, a
large portion of which represents additional costs to companies that provide health benefits to their
employees,” he said.
.2 Results Controlling for Conservative Mentions
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